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Searching for Ratchet Effects
in Agricultural Contracts
Douglas  W. Allen and Dean Lueck
In a dynamic contracting  environment,  increasing standards over time in light of
past  performance  is known  as the  ratchet effect.  Despite  the  recent theoretical
attention given to the ratchet effect, models that include these effects have not been
empirically  tested against contract data.  In this study, we use farm-level data on
modern Great Plains agricultural  cash rent and cropshare contracts to test for the
presence  of ratchet  effects in  the context  of a principal-agent  model with moral
hazard. We find limited evidence for the ratchet effect within share contracts, and
no  evidence that it is important for the choice  of contract between  cash rent and
cropshare.
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Introduction
The tendency forperformance  standards  to increase  after a period  ofgood
performance is called the ratchet effect.
- Milgrom and Roberts, p. 232
The economic theory of contracts continues to evolve, and in the past 20 years, work on
dynamic contract  issues has become more common. The bulk of this literature  relies
on the standard principal-agent  model where an uninformed principal  deals with an
informed agent. In such a model, a principal designs an optimal contract that is both
incentive-compatible  and profit-maximizing.  In general, the optimal contract provides
incentives for the agent, so that higher levels of output lead to higher levels of pay. In
a dynamic context, the principal and the agent engage in a series of contracts over time.
If the principal does not commit to constant contractual terms, then as he collects infor-
mation on past performance,  the principal uses this information to set new standards
of agent behavior in order to increase  wealth. This increase  of standards over time in
light of past performance is known as the ratchet  effect.
The term "ratchet" comes from early studies of manufacturing in the Soviet Union,
where planners would often penalize plant managers for increased output-claiming the
higher output proved "shirking" in earlier periods.1From these earlier studies, and from
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ratchet effect in a model with moral hazard, similar to that used by Meyer and Vickers. Other theoretical studies examine
this  effect in models  with adverse  selection  where  the ratchet effect leads  to excessive  pooling equilibria (e.g.,  Freixas,
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the theoretical literature, it is well known that using past performance to define future
standards creates incorrect incentives for the agent. As a result, in order for optimal
(first-best) contracts to emerge, it is important that the principal be able to commit to
a stable multiperiod contract.
Commitment to contract terms is critical because when agents anticipate the ratchet
effect,  they  lower  their  efforts  in the  current  period  given  that they expect  to  be
punished in the future. This lower level of effort reduces the joint value of the contract
and, as a result, provides the incentive for principals to commit themselves to the terms
of a contract when dealing with the same agent over time.2 On the other hand, when
information is produced by one agent who then leaves, and then a new agent is hired,
the principal may exploit what was learned with the past employee by increasing the
new agent's incentives within the contract.3 In this case, there is no reduction in effort
in the first period because  there is a different agent in each period. This change  in
contract terms in the second period reflects the better information  about the relative
contributions of the new agent and the random inputs of nature. More specifically, the
better information results in a lower estimated variance of performance in the second
period.  A lower  estimated  variance  implies  the  principal  makes fewer mistakes  in
separating the agent's contribution to output from nature's contribution.
Principal-agent  models  that incorporate  a ratchet  effect lead to  a rather strong
prediction regarding the dynamic structure of contracts.4 When there is a new agent,
and past performance reveals useful information about the current period, then contract
incentives  should strengthen over time, with the fixed payment to the principal also
increasing over time.5 However, when the principal continually contracts with the same
agent, then the contract incentives and effort levels should remain constant. Milgrom
and Roberts characterize this contract structure as follows:
The theory thus predicts  that when the parties write contracts for one period at a
time and when past performance embodies useful information for evaluating future
performance,  incentives will become more intense over time, as the parties utilize
past  experience  to incorporate  more accurate  performance  expectations  in their
contracts....  [T]he  actual effort levels  elicited from  the worker will also rise over
time.... The argument ... is only correct, however, if there is a new occupant in the
job in each period (p. 234).
Despite  the  recent theoretical  attention  given to  the ratchet  effect,  models  that
include these effects have not been empirically tested against contract data.6 In this
2Methods of commitment may take different forms, including long-term agreements, reputation, and specific investments.
Kanemoto and MacLeod show how competition from older workers  can ameliorate  the ratchet effect under some circum-
stances.
3 The principal is made better off from the new knowledge; hence the fixed side payment made by the agent to the principal
must also increase with the incentives in the contract.
4 Refutable implications arising from dynamic models, like the ratchet effect, are rare. This may explain the common use
of adjectives such as "celebrated" (Salanie, p.  158) in discussions of the ratchet effect.
In a standard principal-agent  model, lower standards over time are not possible. This is because informed agents would
never accept the initial contract if it contained performance standards that were too high and violated their individual ration-
ality constraints.
6 Much of the ratchet literature still examines Soviet-style organizations. More recently, however, the applications have
expanded to include the U.S. military (Ickes and Samuelson), private ownership (Olsen and Torsvik), and labor markets
(Kanemoto and MacLeod). The analysis of ratchet effects is now found in theoretical textbooks (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts;
Laffont and Tirole; and Salanie).
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analysis,  we use farm-level  data on modern Great  Plains agricultural cash  rent and
cropshare contracts-classic examples of a principal-agent relationship-to test for the
presence of ratchet effects.
A Two-Period Model of Farmland
Contracts with Ratchet Effects
We use  a two-period  principal-agent  model  of farmland  contracting,  adapted  from
Milgrom and Roberts, to clarify the ratchet effect and demonstrate its testable implica-
tions. We make the following assumptions: (a) the landowner (principal) is risk neutral
and the farmer (agent) is risk averse,  (b) all cost and revenue functions are the same
each period, (c) there are no wealth effects, (d) there is no discounting,  and (e) nature
draws from the same distribution in both periods. These are the standard assumptions
made in a dynamic principal-agent model in order to focus on the ratchet effect. The no-
wealth-effect assumption implies that the coefficient of risk aversion is constant, and
that the optimal contract maximizes the total certainty equivalent income, subject to
any incentive constraints.7
Furthermore, we assume there is a pool of homogeneous farmers, which rules out
adverse selection and leaves only a moral hazard problem.8 Farmer moral hazard exists
because nature plays a large role in agricultural production, and because farmer effort
is costly to observe. Pests, weather, and other seasonal effects often have large impacts,
and can disguise the true effort of a farmer. Over time, however, landowners become
more knowledgeable  about nature, and they might use this information  to alter the
contract in their favor.
In modern  agriculture, landowners  often rent out their land to farmers,  and two
forms of incentive contracts dominate-cropshare and cash rent contracts. In principle,
a cash rent contract is the limiting case  of a share contract, where the  share to the
farmer reaches  100%,  and the only  payment to the landowner  is the fixed rent. In
practice, however, modern cropshare contracts seldom have shares greater than 80%.9
Hence, there are two potential ways in which  a ratchet effect might manifest itself.
First, there  may  be  a  ratchet  effect  in  the  choice  of  one  type  of  contract  versus
another. Second, the ratchet effect might arise within share contracts.  We search  for
ratchet  effects  in both contexts,  beginning with  the choice  between  cash  rent and
cropshare contracts, and then examining the ratchet effect within cropshare contracts
alone.
7We make these assumptions to focus on the ratchet effect. The ratchet effect, however, does not depend on any of the
classic principal-agent assumptions. In particular, risk aversion is not necessary. A ratchet effect can exist in more compli-
cated multiple moral hazard models and models of adverse selection without the assumption of risk aversion. For an example
of a ratchet effect model with moral hazard and no risk aversion, see Meyer and Vickers.
8 This is a reasonable  assumption in the context  of farming. For the two  states that we  examine,  farmers are demo-
graphically very similar. Also, the use of tractors and other types of farm machinery tends to equalize the ability to farm, as
sheer physical strength is less of a factor. We recognize that farmers are literally not identical and that, as a result, some
learning will take place over time for the landowner  regarding the farmer.
9  A share contract often requires the farmer to pay a fraction of the nonlabor input costs such as seed and fertilizer (Allen
and Lueck 1993). A cash rent contract requires the farmer to pay for all inputs.
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Table 1.  Summary of Dynamic Contracting Cases
Landowner  Constant  Presence
committed to  effort and  of
consistent  incentives  ratchet
Contracting Case  contract?  each period?  effect?  Empirical Implementation
Case I  Yes  Yes  No  Same agent in both periods
Case II  No  No  Yes  Different agent in each period
Cash  Rent versus Cropshare  Contracts
In agricultural land leasing where farmers and landowners contract over the use of land
and where the choice is between share contracts and cash rent contracts, the principal-
agent model with ratchet effects suggests that new farmers are more likely to lease land
with cash rent contracts, since cash rent contracts are higher powered; that is, they have
stronger agent incentives. When cash rent contracts are used with new farmers, land-
owners can exploit the information obtained over past seasons withprevious  renters and
still maintain the reservation income of those who currently work the land. ° 1
To  show  this,  assume  the  contract  between  the  farmer  (agent)  and  landowner
(principal) generates the following income function for the farmer in each period:
(1)  Y  = aQ - P - C(e) > Y,
where Yis the income to the farmer, Y is the farmer's reservation income from another
plot of land, a is the farmer's share of output Q, P is a side payment to the landowner,
C(e) is the farmer's effort cost function, and the price of output is normalized to one. In
each period i e  {1, 2},  observed output is Qi =  ei +  Oi,  where ei is the unobservable effort
of the farmer, and 
0
i ~ (0, o2) is a random input, caused by nature. 1 A cash rent contract
implies a = 1 and P > 0, while a share contract implies a E [0,  1] and P E (-0o, oo).  A cash
rent contract is a pure high-powered  contract, because the farmer is the complete resid-
ual claimant. A share contract has lower-powered incentives since a < 1.
We  examine  two  moral  hazard  models  that  generate  the  second-best  outcomes
summarized in table 1. In Case I, the landowner commits to maintaining the contract
over two periods, while in Case II there is no such commitment.  Case I corresponds to
the situation of an ongoing landowner-farmer relationship,  while Case II corresponds
to a  new farmer dealing with an established  landowner  in period  2.  In  both cases,
farmers exert less than the first-best level of effort, and the optimal share is less than
one. Compared to the first-best optimum, there is less effort because the farmer does not
own the entire output and there is moral hazard.
10 The ratchet effect appears to grind against Spillman's  1919 "ladder hypothesis" that implies young farmers start with
cropshare  contracts,  move  on to cash rent contracts,  and eventually  have sole ownership  of the farm.  However, the two
concepts are not necessarily at odds. With models that incorporate the ratchet effect,  a new tenant farmer is not the same
as a young tenant farmer.
n This simple production function allows us to focus on the ratchet effect without adding superfluous complications. See
Meyer and Vickers for a similar setup.Journal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
Case I: Dynamic Commitment
First,  consider  the  case  where  the  landowner  ignores  any  new information  when
deciding what incentives to set in period 2, so there is no possibility of a ratchet effect.
This is equivalent to having (dynamic) commitment to the terms of the contract over the
two periods. Given the assumption of no wealth effects, the optimal contract maximizes
the total certainty equivalent income of the farmer and the landowner, subject to the
incentive-compatibility  constraints for each period.12 As a result, the optimal contract
follows from:
(2)  max TCE  = Q(el)  + Q(e2)  - C(e,)  - C(e2)  - l/2rVar(al,0  + a202),
el,e2
s.t.:  a1 = C'(e,) and  a2 = C'(e2),
where r is the constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Since the problem is sym-
metric across periods, and since by assumption Var(01) = Var(02 ), the optimal solution
requires a, = a2, and el  = e2. This means that the contract has identical incentives and
work effort of the farmer in each period.
Case II: No Commitment over Time
Now consider the case in which two one-period contracts are made sequentially, and the
landowner learns about the relative contribution of nature by observing the output in
the first period.  In this case, there is no commitment to the terms of the contract over
the two periods. Following Milgrom and Roberts, we model the acquisition of informa-
tion by assuming there is a positive correlation between the values of the random inputs
(01  and 02) in the two periods; that is, a high value of 01 suggests a high value of 02 is
likely. This means that the landowner can use observed performance in the first period
to get an estimate  (02)  of the random input in the second  period  (02).  In turn, this
estimate  (02)  can be used to obtain a better estimate of the farmer's actual effort in the
second period (e2).13
Let the landowner's estimate of 02 be given by 02  = y(el + 01),  where y is an adaptive
expectation of the landowner, used to estimate nature's contribution to farm output in
the second period. The landowner's estimate of second-period output in terms of second-
period effort becomes  Q2 = Q2 - 02 = e2 + 02 - 02.  The landowner now uses this informa-
tion to adjust the contract so that the farmer's compensation (gross income) over the two
periods becomes:14
Y  =  [  + aQ1] +  [P2  +  2].
12 The certainty equivalent  for the farmer is simply his average  pay minus his risk premium and cost of effort.
13 This simple specification of the correlation in random inputs can easily apply to agriculture where the effect of nature
is often relatively straightforward.  For example, a particular hay field may have poor drainage or slope which leads to poor
drying conditions and reduced hay output. Knowledge of this information gained in the first period helps the landowner better
estimate the drying contribution of nature in the second period. Although the role of nature is straightforward,  we do not
imply that the landowner  can learn everything in a short period of time.
1
4 Because we focus on gross income, the C(e) term is gone. This simplifies the analysis without altering the predictions.
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After substituting {Q  =  e  + 01},  {Q 2 = e2  + 02  - 02},  and  {02  = y(el + 01)},  and collecting
terms, the compensation function (3) can be rewritten as:
(4)  Y  = [P1  + (a,  - ya 2)(e  + 01)]  + [P2 + a,(e2+  02)].
It  is clear that the effective  share  coefficient  on  first-period  effort  (e,)  is not the
nominal contract amount (a:) paid under the case of commitment,  but a smaller net
amount (a, - ya 2). In terms of first-period compensation, the direct return to additional
effort is a,, but greater effort in the first period leads to a reduction in compensation for
second-period effort by ya2. This means the share in the first period is lower than the
share in the second period.'5 This is the ratchet effect. The incentives for farmer effort
are increased (or become more high powered) from period 1 to period 2. In other words,
the farmer's share of output is "ratcheted up" over time as long as there is no commit-
ment to contract terms  and the landowner  can learn about the value of the random
input.16In the case where the farmer's incentive increases to the point where a2 = 100%,
the contract has switched from a share contract to a cash rent contract.
Thus far, the model has been specified in terms of the landowner's ability to commit
to a contract or not. When there is commitment, there are constant incentives or shares
across periods. When there is no commitment, there is the ratchet effect or rising shares
over time. In order to operationalize this model, we consider commitment as equivalent
to  an ongoing relationship  between  a farmer  and a landowner. When  a farmer and
landowner have an ongoing relationship, they have an incentive to avoid the ratchet
effect, and we expect that they will commit to consistent contract terms over time. On
the  other hand, if there  is  a new tenant  farmer,  there  is no  commitment, and  an
opportunistic landowner will fully exploit his knowledge based on past information. In
this case, incentives should be higher than with the past tenant farmer.
An additional implication  of this reasoning is that if a new landowner is involved in
the second-period contract, then constant incentives should be used because he will be
unable to accurately measure the past performance  on the farm. Over the two periods
the ratchet effect will be absent because a change in landowners means that the prin-
cipal is not able to acquire information about the agent's past performance. This leads
to two predictions  about the choice of a contract:
*  PREDICTION 1. New farmers contracting  with established  landowners  are more like-
ly to cash rent land.
*  PREDICTION 2. New landowners  contracting  with either new or established  farmers
are more likely to cropshare.
1 6 This model does not imply the contract  would have  a complicated formula whereby the  share in the  second period
would be 50% plus some fraction of the share in the first period. We would simply observe two sequential share contracts that
might give the first farmer 50% of the crop in the first year, and then observe a second farmer getting 60% of the crop in the
second year.
16 The benefit of the  acquired information  is the reduction  in the variance in the landowner's estimate  of the value  of
random input; that is, Var(0 2 - 62) < Var(0 2). When the landowner  has a better measure of the random input, he has a
more accurate picture of the farmer's contribution as well, and can better alter the contract to increase his returns. Hence,
although the share to the farmer increases, the side payment to the landowner also increases, making the landowner better
off.
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The Terms of Share Contracts
A ratchet effect might also lead to changes in the terms of a cropshare contract, without
causing a switch to cash rent contracts. Because the formal analysis in this context is
similar to the contract choice model, we explicitly analyze only Case II (no commitment).
To begin, we simplify by replacing the side payment with an input cost share. Although
modern share contracts do not often have side payments, they routinely share nonlabor
input costs (Allen and Lueck 1993).  As a result, the income for a farmer with a share
contract becomes:
(5)  Y  = aQ - K - C(e) > Y,
where 6 e (0,  1) is the share of input costs borne by the farmer, K represents aggregate
nonlabor input costs (e.g., fertilizer, seed), and Qi =  ei +  Ki +  Oi in each period to include
noneffort inputs.1 7
The farmer's two-period compensation without commitment is now:
(6)  Y  =  [aQ 1 - l6,K]  + [a2-  62K2]
where  6K replaces the side payment P. As above, a series of substitutions--{Q  =  e1+
K, + 09}, {Q2 =e2 +K2 + 02 - 02}, and  {02  = y(e,  +K ) + 0,1}-allows us to rewrite the com-
pensation function as:
(7)  Y  = [(a, - a2)(e,  +  K,  + 0)  - 6K] + [a 2(e2 + K2 + 02)  - 62K2].
Since the structure of this problem is identical to the contract choice problem,  the
structure of the solution is also identical. As before, it is clear that the effective share
coefficient  on first-period  effort (el) is not the nominal  contract  amount  (a,), but a
smaller amount  (ca  - yo2). This implies that effort and the actual shares increase over
time. Again, this is the ratchet effect. When there is no commitment, output shares (a)
will be higher for new farmers. Notice that equation (7) also implies that the input cost
shares remain constant over time. In contrast, if a new landowner  is involved in the
contract, he has no knowledge  of past performance,  and consequently that landowner
should not provide the farmer with higher-powered incentives. The ratchet effect, there-
fore, plays a similar role within share contracts in terms of incentives increasing over
time, which leads to the second set of predictions:
*  PREDICTION  3.  New farmers should receive a higher output share than farmers
with ongoing contracts;  however, input cost shares should remain constant.
*  PREDICTION  4. New  landowners should not change the output shares to their
farmers compared to established  landowners.
17 We assume, for simplicity, that the inputs Ki are observable. This leads to a strong prediction about input shares over
time. This prediction, however, is not found elsewhere in the ratchet literature, and does not hold if inputs are assumed unob-
servable. Our purpose here is to focus on output shares.
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Empirical Analysis
To test our four predictions,  we use contract data from the "1986 Nebraska and South
Dakota  Leasing  Survey"  (see Johnson  et al.).  A description  of the  data,  as well  as
definitions  and  means  of the variables  used,  can  be  found  in the  appendix.  Each
observation represents a single farmland contract between a farmer and a landowner
for a given plot of land. There are 3,432 contracts in total, of which 2,424 are cropshare
and 1,008 are cash rent.  Of these, 264 cropshare  contracts and 29 cash rent contracts
had new farmers within five years of the survey. In addition, 115 cropshare and 38 cash
rent  contracts  had new  landowners  within  five years  of the  survey.  The  data  set
provides information on whether input and output shares changed, and the direction of
the change for output shares.
Ideally, to test the ratchet effect, we would like a panel data set containing informa-
tion on contract terms as well as farmers and landowners. However, because our cross-
section data include retroactive information, they are well suited to test the predictions
from the ratchet effect model. In particular, the data contain information on the history
of tenant farmers over the five years  prior to the survey. This is the critical piece  of
information that allows us to test for ratchet effects because we know whether or not
there has been a change in the tenant farmer or the landowner. Hence, the two periods
in our model  correspond  to the  periods with the  old and new farmer,  i.e.,  period  1
corresponds to the old farmer, and period 2 corresponds to the new farmer.
We use these data to test the predictions  of our model by estimating the effects  of
new farmers and landowners on contract choices and on the terms of cropshare leases.
In general, the ratchet effect predicts that cash rent contracts should be more common,
and output shares should be higher in the second period.  For this estimation we also
use the variables ACRES, AGE, FAMILY, HAY, INPUTS CHANGED, IRRIGATION,
POP  DENSITY, ROW CROP, and YEARS to control for farm size, farmer's age, whether
or not contracts are between family members, the presence of hay, whether the number
of inputs changed, the presence of irrigation, local population density, the type of crop,
and the number of years the landowner and farmer have contracted with each other.
These variables are chosen based on past work which not only provides a theoretical
rationale for including them, but also shows that they are empirically relevant (Allen
and Lueck 1992a, 1992b, 1993). In particular, includingAGE allows us to control for the
effects of farming experience,  and assures that our NEW FARMER variable is repre-
senting farmers who are new to the plot of land. We test these predictions  using the
entire contract sample, as well as several subsamples.
Cash Rent versus Cropshare Contracts
To test Predictions 1 and 2, we use a sample that contains both cropshare and cash rent
contracts.1 8 Table  2 presents the results  of several logit regressions  on the choice  of
contract. The dependent variable in all cases is one if  the contract is cropshare, and zero
18 Cropshare contracts usually do not contain a side payment. Nevertheless, we can still use these data to test the ratchet
effect model, because inputs are shared and adjustments can be made to input shares that are equivalent to adjusting fixed
payments. The second model in this study demonstrated  how simply the model can be adjusted along these lines.
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Table 2. Logit Estimates on Contract Choice (dependent variable = 1 if share
contract, 0 if cash rent contract)
Estimated Coefficients
Full  Non-family  Oral  Annual  Predicted















































































































-2 Log Likelihood  4,155  2,358  2,218  986
Percent Correct Predictions  81.56  83.58  81.81  83.42
No. Observations  3,432  1,912  2,067  947
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.
if the contract is cash rent. The first column of numbers presents the results using the
entire contract sample.  The other logit estimates are undertaken for three additional
subsamples: contracts for which the farmer and landowner are unrelated (column 2),
only oral contracts (column 3), and annual or short-term contracts (column 4).
Each of these subsamples allows us to control for various factors that might influence
the magnitude of the potential ratchet effects. In each case, the ratchet effect is expected
to be larger than the full sample case. For example, it might be expected that the ratchet
effect is stronger with unrelated individuals because more information is known about
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics for New Farmers and New Landowners Within
Share Contracts
Only a New Farmer  Only a New Landowner
Variables  Number  Percent  Number  Percent
Total Sample  264  100.0  115  100.0
Share  of inputs changed  47  17.8  18  15.7
No. of shared inputs changed  37  14.0  8  7.0
Lease changed to cropshare  36  13.6  10  8.7
Farmer's share decreased  15  5.7  10  8.7
Farmer's share increased  20  7.6  5  4.3
family members to begin with, and ratcheting-up incentives on relatives may be frowned
on within a family. Conversely, oral contracts involve less commitment, and as a result,
ratchet effects should be more common. Likewise, shorter annual contracts may imply
less commitment and a higher likelihood of ratchet effects.
We test for ratchet  effects  by including  the variables NEW FARMER  and NEW
LANDOWNER in the logit regressions. In all cases, Prediction  1 implies a negative coef-
ficient for the NEWFARMER variable, yet the estimated coefficient for NEWFARMER
is positive and statistically insignificant (table 2). This indicates that in contracts where
we use the variable NEWFARMER to identify situations of a lack of commitment, there
is no ratchet effect. Prediction 2 implies that the presence of a new landowner should
increase the probability of a share contract. Although the estimated coefficient forNEW
LANDOWNER has the expected sign in the full sample, it is also statistically insignif-
icant. These insignificant results hold not only in the full sample case, but also in each
of the subsample  cases  where ratchet effects should have been more likely to occur.
Overall,  then, the estimates  shown in table 2 fail to reject the null hypothesis  of no
ratchet effects, and suggest that the threat of a ratchet effect has virtually no impact on
the choice of land leasing contract.
Changes in Share Contracts
The second set of empirical tests examines the determinants of particular sharing rules
within cropshare contracts in order to test Predictions  3 and 4. Table 3 reports some
summary statistics for cases in which  a new landowner  or farmer  is involved in the
cropshare  contract. The data in table  3 are generally inconsistent with ratchet effects
existing within the set of all share contracts.  First, when there is a new farmer, both
input cost shares and the number of inputs changed, refuting Prediction 3 which states
they should remain constant. However, the output share to the farmer increased more
often than it decreased, which is consistent with Prediction 3. Furthermore, when there
is a new landowner, input cost shares changed less often, and output shares decreased
more often than they increased.  These summary statistics are generally inconsistent
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with a ratchet effect; however,  the difference in proportions between the two samples
is not statistically significant.19
To further test Predictions  3 and 4, we use several samples containing only share
contracts to estimate the following model:
(8)  ln(a/(1  - a))  = Z  +  + e,
where a is the farmer's share of the output, Z is a row vector of explanatory variables,
) is a column vector of unknown coefficients, and e is an error term.20 This equation has
two relevant variables: NEW FARMER and NEWLANDOWNER.  Under Prediction 3,
the expected sign for the estimated coefficient of NEW FARMER is positive,  since a
higher share means the contract has higher power. Prediction 4 implies a negative sign
for the estimated coefficient of NEW LANDOWNER.  Table 4 presents the results from
four OLS estimations of equation (8). As with the regression results from table 2, there
is no consistent  support for the ratchet effect within share contracts.  The estimated
coefficients forNEWLANDOWNER, although negative as predicted by Prediction 4, are
statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficients forNEWFARMER are statistically
insignificant at the 5%  level, and have the wrong sign in two cases.
Predictions 3 and 4 also can be tested by estimating the probability that a farmer's
cropshare changed in the recent past. Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients from a
logit regression in which the dependent variable is one if the farmer's share increased
within the last five years. The estimates show limited support for the presence of ratchet
effects. First, the estimated equation shows that NEWFARMER is positively related to
rising farmer shares, consistent with Prediction 3. Second, the estimated equation also
shows that NEW LANDOWNER is positively related to rising farmer shares, inconsis-
tent with Prediction 4.
Discussion:  Economic Significance and
Other Variables
Two separate tests of ratchet effects have been conducted. The first examined whether
contracts  would be switched from low-powered share contracts  to high-powered cash
rent contracts,  and the second looked  at whether shares would be increased when a
new farmer started farming the land. In both cases, virtually no evidence of a ratchet
effect was found. Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients  for the two
variables NEW LANDOWNER  and NEW FARMER  were dwarfed by the size  of the
estimated coefficients of the other variables in the regression, suggesting that ratchet
effects have little economic significance.  From table 2, we see that several nonratchet
variables  have  much larger  coefficients.  In particular,  the coefficient  on the binary
variable  ROW CROP is almost  11 times larger than the coefficients  for the binary
ratchet variables. From table 4, even in the full sample case where output shares do rise
19  Allen and Lueck (1993)  conducted one of the few empirical studies on input shares in cropshare contracts. They found
a strong positive relationship between the number of inputs shared and the farmer's output share, as well as a strong positive
relationship between the size of the farmer's input cost share and the farmer's output share.
20 We use the log of the odds ratio to create a nonlimited dependent variable, since the share is naturally bounded from
zero to one.
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Table 4.  OLS Estimates of Output Share in  Share Contract Sample (depen-
dent variable =  ln[SHARE/(1  - SHARE)])
Estimated Coefficients
Full  Non-family  Oral  Annual  Predicted
















































































































Adjusted R2 0.025  0.027  0.014  0.021
F-Statistic  6.71  4.71  3.01  4.11
[d.f.]  [11,  2,412]  [10,  1,314]  [11,  1,584]  [11,  1,606]
No. Observations  2,423  1,324  1,595  1,617
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
with the presence of new farmers, the effect ofNEWFARMER and  NEWLANDOWNER
is not as large as that associated with the choice of crop.21 Hence, in addition to the lack
of statistical significance,  the small coefficient  size also suggests that these two vari-
ables have a small economic impact, and that the ratchet effect is unimportant in the
context of this contracting example.
21 Allen and Lueck (1992b, 1993)  found that the choice of a row crop where the soil is worked intensively was the single
most important variable explaining the choice of contract.
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Table  5.  Logit Estimates  of Changes  in  Share Contracts (dependent
variable = SHARE-UP)
Estimated






































-2 Log Likelihood  612.9
Percent Correct Predictions  97.19
No. Observations  2,424
Note:  Numbers in parentheses  are asymptotic t-statistics.
Although the two variables for new farmers and landowners  most directly test for
ratchet effects, the positive estimated coefficient on the YEARS  variable in table 2 could
be interpreted as consistent with the ratchet effect. This positive relationship  shows
that long-time  contracting parties are more likely to choose share contracts over cash
rent contracts and, as such, the variable YEARS  could be considered as a proxy ratchet
variable. The longer two parties contract with each other, the more likely the contract
involves commitment and lower-powered incentives, despite the learning experienced
over time by the landowner. Again, the effect is small both in absolute size and relative
to other variables. The estimates in table 2 imply that an additional year to the rela-
tionship, calculated  around the mean of the dependent variable, leads to just a 0.61%
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increase in the probability of a share contract. Compared to the effect of having a row
crop, which increases the probability of a share contract by 56% at the mean, this effect
is economically unimportant.  In the context of tables 3 and 4, one might consider the
YEARS  coefficient along the same lines. In these cases, however, the estimated coeffi-
cients for YEARS  are not consistent with the ratchet effect. In table 4, the coefficient is
positive  and statistically  significant,  indicating  that longer-term  relationships  have
greater share terms. This is not only inconsistent with Prediction 3, but also suggests
that landowners  do not commit to terms with ongoing farmers. Finally, in table 5, the
estimated coefficient for YEARS is insignificantly different from zero. Taken together,
the effect of YEARS on contract design offers little support for the existence of econom-
ically important ratchet effects in agriculture.22
Conclusion
The literature on contract theory has flourished in the past 20 years, but empirical tests
have been limited.23 The ratchet effect literature is a classic  example  of this trend.
Though the hypothesis arose in the context of Soviet manufacturing, it has subsequently
been applied to private contracting. By our count, there are over 20 papers dealing with
ratchet effects, along with an entire chapter in an important text (Laffont and Tirole).
To our knowledge, the present study is the first empirical analysis of the ratchet effect.
The reason for the lack of empirical  work is that evidence to test for the presence  of
ratchet effects is generally unavailable. Data on both sides of the contract-farmer and
landowner in our case-as well as contract history are required. Our data are unique
in meeting these requirements and allowing for testing.
Because agriculture and share contracting are important theoretical applications  of
the principal-agent model,  and because our data meet the conditions  laid out in the
theoretical literature, this study provides an important test. Our evidence suggests that
the ratchet effect is generally unimportant in modern agricultural land contracts.  We
did find that within cropshare contracts there is limited evidence that input and output
shares move in ways consistent with ratchet effects, although the effects are relatively
small. We find virtually no evidence to support the ratchet effect in the determination
of contract choice compared to other explanatory variables. Overall, our estimates show
that even in the limited cases in which there is support for a ratchet effect in private
agricultural share contracts, these effects tend not to be economically significant.
Although the purpose of this study has been to search  for the presence of ratchet
effects, our findings  do raise the question as to why ratchet  effects are so limited in
these data. Several possibilities exist. First, if farmer heterogeneity is important, then
adverse  selection incentives in the absence  of commitment (Freixas, Guesnerie,  and
Tirole; Salanie) could lead to other behavior that would not generate the ratchet effects
in Predictions  1-4. This seems unlikely in the context of farming where farmers and
22  This regression  has an unusually high number  of correct predictions. This occurs simply because there are very few
positive responses. For most contracts, the terms of trade remain relatively stable over time.
23 This is not to say there have not been significant empirical findings in this literature beyond ratchet effect studies (e.g.,
notable are Joskow; Crocker and Masten; Lafontaine; and Leffler and Rucker).  See Shelanski and Klein for a survey of the
empirical contract literature, and Knoeber for a survey of the empirical agricultural literature on contracts.
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landowners are relatively homogeneous. Second, if  information about farmers and land-
owners is sufficiently cheap to produce,en  then the landowner may face reputation costs,
even across agents, which would limit his ability to change contracts when dealing with
a new farmer.  Third, in our past work (Allen and Lueck  1992b,  1993),  we found that
multiple-task moral hazard is important in determining contract choice.  This explains
the dominance  of row crops innce  c  our estimates. Row crops require large amounts of soil
manipulation,  and share contracts are used to retard overexploitation.  It  may be the
case that soil manipulation is so important that adjusting the shares for a ratchet effect
leads to serious soil depletion. Unfortunately,  our data do not allow us to separate out
these different explanations.2 4
The failure of ratchet effects may be unique to agriculture, or it may be quite common.
Ratchet effects can occur only when contract commitment is costly. To the extent that
private contracts arise only when commitment is not costly, then ratchet effects should
not be  expected. Perhaps the best example is still government agencies  where agent
turnover is common, information poor, and reputations hard to establish-all making
commitment difficult. In private contracts, there is a stronger incentive to curb any of
the  ratchet  incentives  and  to  make  commitment  more  feasible.  This,  however,  is
speculation on our part. We leave it to future work on dynamic contracts to explore the
implications of these and other issues.
[Received December 1998; final revision received July 1999.]
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Appendix:
Data Development  and Sources
Data for the landowner-farmer  contracts  come from the "1986 Nebraska  and South Dakota Leasing
Survey." The leasing survey was conducted by Bruce Johnson of the University of  Nebraska and Larry
Jannsen of South Dakota State University.  The survey was funded by the Economic Research Service
of the U.S. Department  of Agriculture  (USDA). A summary of the study and the survey procedures
can be  found in  Johnson et  al.'s  1988  report  prepared  for  the USDA/Economic  Research  Service,
Agricultural Land Leasing and  in  Rental Market Characteristics:  A  Case Study of South Dakota and
Nebraska.
In conducting their 1986 leasing survey, Johnson and Jannsen obtained a list of landowners and
farmers (from the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service's list of  producers) in each county
in Nebraska and South Dakota who participate in, or are eligible to participate in, federal commodity
programs. (According to Steven Munk, USDA Extension Agent for Minnehaha  County in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota,  essentially all farmers  in these two states are eligible  for federal  programs.  Conse-
quently, we do not have any sample selection bias in the data.)
From the farmer-landowner list, a random sample of names was chosen; the survey was sent to 6,347
individuals in Nebraska and 4,111 in South Dakota. The response rate was 32% for Nebraska and 35%
for South Dakota. In the data set, the number of usable responses was 1,615 for Nebraska and 1,155
for South Dakota. Each observation represents a single farmer or landowner for the 1986 crop season.
To conduct our tests, we reorganized the data so that each observation is a single farmland contract
between  a  farmer  and  a landowner.  Because  many  individuals  had more  than one  contract,  this
increased the sample size by 20% and resulted in 2,101 observations for Nebraska and 1,331 for South
Dakota, yielding a total of 3,432 observations  for our full sample.
The leasing survey data contain information on the general attributes of the farmer and landowner,
the number of acres owned and leased, the type of contract, the shares and cash rent, the type of crop
grown, and other similar information.  The data set has no information on the levels of inputs used in
farming.  There  are several questions  on pasture/range  leases, but due to differences  in the type of
questions, the pasture lease data are not comparable to those for the cropshare or cash rent contracts.
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There are relatively few pasture leases as well. The leasing survey data were combined with county-
level data on population per square mile taken from the County and City Data  Book 1987, published
by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. This information was used to calculate
the POP  DENSITY variable used in our regressions.
Definitions of the variables used in our analysis, and their means, are presented in table Al below.
Table Al.  Variable Definitions and Means
Means
All  Share



















=  1 if contract is share contract; 0 if contract is
cash rent contract
=  Percent cropshare to farmer
=  1 if share to farmer increased in past 5 years;
0 if share has not changed in past 5 years
=  1 if farmer is new within past 5 years
=  1 if landowner is new within past 5 years
=  Number of acres covered by contract
=  Categorial age of farmer:
1 if <25 years
2 if 25-34 years
3 if 35-44 years
4 if 45-54 years
5 if 55-65 years
6 if > 65 years
=  1 if landowner and farmer are related
=  1 if alfalfa, brome, or native hay
=  1 if more inputs were  shared in past 5 years
=  1 if land is irrigated
=  Population per square mile in the county of
farm operation
=  1 if corn, sugar beets, soybeans, or sorghum
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